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Abstract 
Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals 
receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available 
but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated us-
ing a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are 
not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future 
research are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies have identified a hidden cost of incentives [1] [2] [3]. A hidden 
cost of incentives occurs when intrinsically motivated behaviors such as reci-
procity, honesty and fairness that otherwise would be present in the absence of 
formal incentives are withheld in their presence. These costs may be accentuated 
when the choice to use formal incentives is made by an individual seeking to 
gain from their use and the individual who is the subject of the incentives is 
aware of the deliberate choice. 
Also identified in the literature is a hidden return to incentives (HRTI). HRTI 
occurs when the decision maker has a choice to use formal incentives, but de-
clines. Fehr & List [2] and Fehr & Rockenbach [3] report on experiments using 
the trust game [4] and find HRTI. In comparing the condition where incentives 
are available but not chosen by the trustor to the condition where no incentives 
are available, reciprocity by the trustee is higher in the former. 
In a more recent experiment, [5] use variations on the gift-exchange game to 
study incentives, but fail to find HRTI. Even more surprising, the introduction 
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of an option to use incentives reduces reciprocity when the option is not taken 
compared to when it is unavailable. A potential explanation for this failure to 
replicate is the inherent differences in the gift-exchange and trust games and 
how the parties view their relationship.1 That is, the difference in games may al-
ter how the individuals frame their decision. 
We conduct a gift-exchange experiment that investigates HRTI using design 
choices that more closely follow the trust games experiments than [5].2 Despite 
the remaining differences in the games, our results are similar to those of [5], in 
that the introduction of an option to use incentives reduces reciprocity when not 
chosen relative to when not available. Our results appear to call into question the 
robustness of the HRTI. We conclude by suggesting several follow-up experi-
ments. 
2. Background 
Fehr & List [2] and Fehr & Rockenbach [3] report on largely identical experi-
ments based on the trust game. In their Trust game both the trustor and trustee 
receive the same endowment, w. The trustor chooses an integer x ≤ w, to trans-
fer to the trustee. The transferred amount is tripled, becoming 3x. The trustor 
requests that an amount y' be returned to her; y' is payoff irrelevant. The trustee 
learns of y', and then decides an integer amount y ≤ 3x, to be returned to the 
trustor. The trustor’s and trustee’s earnings are (w − x + y) and (w + 3x − y), re-
spectively. In both studies w is set to 10 experimental units.  
In their Trust with Punishment variation of the game (TWP), the trustor may 
choose to play the Trust game with the trustee, or alternatively, may choose a 
formal contract with the trustee wherein the trustee must pay a fine of 4 to the 
experimenter if y < y'. Before making his decision, the trustee knows which op-
tion the trustor has chosen. In TWP, y' becomes payoff relevant only if the pu-
nishment option is taken. Note further the sub-game if the principal refrains 
from punishment in TWP and the Trust game are identical. The basic result that 
emerges is that both x and y are greater in TWP when the trustor refrains from 
punishment than in Trust where punishment is not available. Fehr and List label 
this HRTI. 
Kuang & Moser [5] employ a gift-exchange game very similar to that found in 
[6]. A gift-exchange game differs from a trust game in two primary ways. While 
a gift-exchange has a transfer from the trustor to the trustee and a return from 
the trustee to the trustor (in the form or “effort”), it is the choice of the trustee 
that increases social welfare, not the trustor. Perhaps more importantly, the 
game is usually framed as an employment relationship rather than just two indi-
viduals interacting. 
Kuang & Moser [5] have a Gift-Exchange treatment, which uses a basic gift- 
exchange game without the possibility of punishment that is analogous to Trust 
in the experiment of [2] and [3]. They also have a Choice treatment, wherein the 
 
 
1A detailed description of the gift-exchange game used in our experiment is in the Method section.  
2This study was approved by the Ohio State behavioral IRB, study number 2015B0085.  
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trustor chooses between (1) a basic gift-exchange game and (2) a formal “forcing 
contract”, wherein it is incentive compatible to choose the efficient effort level. 
Note the difference between [5] and trust experiments: in TWP only a return of 
4 is incentive compatible, which is not efficient, whereas in [5] social efficient 
effort is incentive compatible. In contrast to HRTI, wages, effort and trustor 
earnings are lower when formal incentives are declined than when unavailable. 
3. Method 
In order to further examine the robustness of HRTI we administer a gift-ex- 
change game with the same parameters as [5], but otherwise more closely fol-
lowing the protocols of the aforementioned trust games. Specifically, socially ef-
ficient levels of effort are not incentive compatible and the principal makes an 
effort level request analogous to the “return” requests in [2] and [3]. 
The principal chooses to pay an agent a wage w, where { }20, 21, , 120w∈  . 
After learning the wage, the agent selects an effort, e, where { }0.1, 0.2, , 1e∈  . 
The principal’s earnings are e(120 − w). The agent’s earnings are w − c(e), where 
c(e) is the cost of effort to the agent. The relationship between effort and costs is 
shown below: 
 
e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
c (e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
Two treatments were administered. In both treatments the principal requests 
a level of effort from the agent, e'. In the Gift-Exchange treatment the game is 
played as described above, and e' is not payoff relevant. The equilibrium is for 
the principal to set w = 20 and for the agent to set e = 0.1. 
In the Choice treatment, the principal can choose to either play a gift-ex- 
change game as described above, or a gift-exchange game with punishment. The 
punishment is in the form of a fine of 6 paid by the agent to the experimenter if e 
< e'. The principal also surrenders 2 to the experimenter if the fine is adminis-
tered. If the punishment is chosen, e' becomes payoff relevant. Assuming indi-
viduals only care about their own payoff, the equilibrium is for the principal to 
choose e' = 0.5 and w = 20 and the agent’s best response is to choose e = 0.5. 
The Gift-Exchange treatment consisted of two sessions with 40 total partici-
pants. The Choice treatment consisted of three sessions with 46 total partici-
pants. All participants were undergraduate volunteers from The Ohio State 
University.3 Agents and principals are re-matched after each period and ten pe-
riods were administered. Experiments were computerized, using z-Tree [7]. 
Our focus is on a comparison of Gift-Exchange treatment (hereafter EX-GE) 
and endogenous gift-exchange (hereafter EN-GE) where the principal made a 
choice of gift-exchange in the Choice treatment. Greater reciprocity in EN-GE 
would be further evidence of the HRTI, while greater reciprocity in EX-GE 
would be a further contradiction, analogous to the result in [5]. 
 
 
3No demographic data were collected.  
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4. Results 
Result 1: Agents’ effort and principals’ payoffs are lower when principals choose 
not to use the punishment (EN-GE) than when no punishment option is availa-
ble (EX-GE). 
Result 1 is opposite HRTI. Summary statistics are found in Table 1. Average 
effort in EN-GE is 0.25, while average effort in EX-GE is 0.43 (Wilcoxon-Mann- 
Whitney test, p < 0.01). Additionally the principals’ earnings in EN-GE are on 
average 15 and are significantly lower than that in EX-GE, with average earnings 
of 25 (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01). 
Figure 1 presents agents’ effort partitioned by wage offers. As might be ex-
pected, the difference between effort provision in EX-GE versus EN-GE is 
mainly found for high wage offers. For low wage offers there is no expectation of 
reciprocity in either condition.  
Result 2: The difference between agents’ effort when principals choose not to 
use the punishment (EN-GE) versus when there is no punishment option (EX- 
GE) mainly occurs in the later periods. 
Figure 2 presents agents’ effort over time. The figure reveals that in the first 
four periods agents’ effort when principals refrain from using the punishment 
option is not significantly different from when the punishment option is not 
available. Moreover, in the latter six periods agents’ effort is significantly lower  
 
 
Figure 1. Agent’s effort across treatments.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics mean (Standard deviation). 
 
Choice 
Exogenous  
Gift-Exchange  
(EX-GE) 
Endogenous  
Punishment  
(EN-PU) 
Endogenous  
Gift-Exchange  
(EN-GE) 
Wage 54 (18) 50 (17) 57 (18) 
Agent’s Effort 0.43 (0.25) 0.37 (0.22) 0.25 (0.23) 
Principal’s Payoffs 25 (13) 24 (16) 15 (14) 
Agent’s Payoffs 49 (15) 43 (16) 55 (18) 
Number of Observations 200 182 48 
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Figure 2. Agent’s effort by periods. 
 
in EN-GE than EX-GE (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.03 in period 5, p = 
0.03 in period 6, p = 0.01 in period 7, p = 0.03 in period 8, p = 0.02 in period 9 
and p = 0.12 in period 10). One interpretation is that as agents have experience 
with punishment they view the relationship with the principal more antagonis-
tically, and withdraw effort even when the principal does not punish. 
5. Further Research 
The hidden returns of incentives have been found in two studies comprising 
three different experiments using the trust game, but have been contradicted in 
two experiments using a gift-exchange game. The most salient difference be-
tween the two is that a gift-exchange game is framed as an employment rela-
tionship while a trust game is not. It is possible that the introduction of penal-
ties, even if not used, is suggestive of an adversarial relationship in gift-exchange 
that is not present in a trust game. Cardinaels & Yin [8], using a bargaining 
game that is also framed as an employment relationship but is somewhat differ-
ent than trust and gift-exchange games, hypothesize that when agents see a pu-
nishment regime being used it signals that principals expect that agents might 
cheat and hence makes cheating appear to be “the norm”.  
Two future experiments might be helpful. The first is bringing the trust and 
gift-exchange games into a single experimental design. This would control for 
potential nuisance factors such as differences in the participant pool. The second 
is to expose participants to the idea of a punishment treatment, without actually 
giving principals the choice to use it, and compare that to a choice treatment. 
This would allow a discernment between agents’ reframing the game after expe-
riencing a punishment versus agent’s reframing the game after only becoming 
aware of a potential punishment regime but not actually experiencing it. 
Finally, an idea that would further explore the robustness of the hidden re-
turns to incentives is to use the trust game as in [2] and [3], but have the partic-
ipants play multiple periods in a “strangers” matching protocol. It is possible 
that once the idea of punishment is made more salient through repetition, reci-
J. Davis et al. 
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procation will decline even if the punishment option is not used. 
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